WAI OLA ALLIANCE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, et al.,

Defendants.

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:22-0272-LEK-RT

DECLARATION OF JOHN
FLOYD IN SUPPORT OF
UNITED STATES'
OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH
PROTECTIVE ORDER

DECLARATION OF JOHN FLOYD IN SUPPORT OF UNITED STATES' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH PROTECTIVE ORDER

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, John Floyd declare:

- 1. Since February 8, 2015, I have held the position of Deputy Director of the Pearl Harbor Fuels Department headquartered at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam (JBPHH), Hawaii.
- 2. In this position, my responsibilities include overseeing the execution of operations and maintenance, including, at one point, the operation of the RHBFSF as part of the JBPHH fuel system. Even without fuel in the tanks, until the Navy's mission of permanent decommissioning of the Red Hill underground storage tanks is complete and the pipelines have been completely disconnected and removed from the facility, the RHBFSF cannot be distinguished from the still fully operating fuel system on JBPHH, Hawaii. This fuel system

supports U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command operations, among others. These systems are connected and many of the documents related to RHBFSF also disclose vulnerabilities to the installation's fuel system at large. Publicly releasing information concerning the specific locations and physical vulnerabilities of fuel tanks, pipelines, valves, hydrants, and documents containing risk and vulnerability assessments for RHBFSF and the JBPHH fuel system would disclose serious vulnerabilities to the U.S.'s antagonists in the Pacific theater and others who may wish to cause harm or disruption.

3. As defined by 10 U.S.C. § 130e, Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCRIT) is: "... sensitive but unclassified information that, if disclosed, would reveal vulnerabilities in Department of Defense critical infrastructure that, if exploited, would likely result in the significant disruption, destruction, or damage of or to Department of Defense operations, property, or facilities, including information regarding the securing and safeguarding of explosives, hazardous chemicals, or pipelines, related to critical infrastructure or protected systems owned or operated by or on behalf of the Department of Defense, including vulnerability assessments prepared by or on behalf of the Department of Defense, explosives safety information (including storage and handling), and other site-specific

information on or relating to installation security."

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- 4. As Fuel Department Deputy Director of JBPHH, it is also my responsibility to ensure that information that has been determined by the Secretary of Defense or his designee to constitute DCRIT not be released to the public, potentially compromising the safety of Navy civilian, military, and contractor personnel, the Navy defense critical infrastructure, and the Department of Defense mission that relies upon it.
- 5. To assist me in these assessments, I relied upon the Statement of the Basis for the Determination by the Chief Management Office dated July 31, 2020, under authority delegated by the Secretary of Defense. Attached hereto as **Exhibit A** is a true and accurate copy of that memorandum. As detailed in this memorandum, the first category of information identified as DCRIT includes physical vulnerabilities of fuel tanks, pipelines, valves, in the RHBFSF and throughout JBPHH, and information on facility operations. Examples include diagrams of tanks, pipelines, hydrant locations, and valve operations. If exploited, this information could provide a potential attacker with information that would allow him or her to determine how and where to most effectively execute an attack. The second category of information identified as DCRIT are those that have the potential for misuse and harm and would impact facility

safety. Of particular concern are documents containing risk vulnerabilities and damage assessments. A person armed with rudimentary knowledge of this risk and damage information could easily determine areas vulnerable for attack.

6. I have reviewed the referenced pages in following documents and conclude that the information described constitutes DCRIT.

Doc Name	Beg Bates	Type of DCRIT
SGH Report	NAVY_0004586	1) Pipe segment and valve locations
		2) Size of piping
Final Hotel Pier Plume Delination - Nov 2021	NAVY_0042005	Pipe segment and valve locations Size of piping
SGH Report Completed Repair Spreadsheet	NAVY_0086049	1) pipe segment locations 2) Size of piping
NAVSUP FLC Pearl Harbor, HI (PRL) Integrity Management Plan- POL Pipelines Pre- Final Submittal May 2015. Enterprise Engineering, Inc.	NAVY_30B6_0000883	Pipe segment and valve station locations Size of piping

(E) (2015)	T	1
(Enterprise, 2015)		
NAVSUP FLC Pearl	NAVY 30B6 0001600	1) Pipe segment and valve
Harbor, HI (PRL)		locations
Integrity		2) Size of piping
Management Plan-		, 11 5
POL Pipelines, Fleet		
Logistics Center		
(FLC) Joint Base		
Pearl Harbor (PRL),		
May 2019.		
Enterprise		
Engineering, Inc.		
(Enterprise, 2019)		
NAVSUP Contract	NAVY 0042881	1) Pipe segment and valve
Report, POL	_	locations
Pipelines Integrity		2) Size of piping
Management Plan,		3) riser station numbers
Volume One, Naval		
Station Pearl Harbor		
(PRL) Parts 1-3,		
October 2023.		
Austin		
Brockenbrough and		
Associates, LLC.		
(Brockenbrough,		
2023)		

NAVSUP Contract	NAVY_0043012	1) Pipe segment and valve
Report, POL		locations
Pipelines Integrity		2) Size of piping
Management Plan,		
Volume One, Naval		
Station Pearl Harbor		
(PRL) Parts 1-3,		
October 2023.		
Austin		
Brockenbrough and		
Associates, LLC.		
(Brockenbrough,		
2023)		
Fuel Transfer	NAVY_0005506	1) Pipe segment and valve
System Inspection	_	locations
Report; Fuel		2) Size of piping
Transfer		
Infrastructure		
Assessment, Naval		
Facilities		
Engineering Systems		
Command		
(NAVFAC)		
Engineering and		
Expeditionary		
Warfare Center		
(EXWC). August		
2022. Austin		
Brockenbrough &		
Associates, LLC.		
Spill History.	NAVY_0058622	Berthing numbers or specific
Spreadsheet. Joint		building numbers
Base Pearl Harbor-		
Hickam Oahu HI. 9		
December 2024.		
(NAVY_0058622)		

Fuel System	NAVY_30B6_0002109	1) valve station locations
Inspection Report-		
Final Submittal		
November 4, 2022.		
Submitted by Austin		
Brockenbrough.		
(Brockenbrough,		
2022b)		
Operation,	NAVY_30B6_0004012	1) location of primary control
Maintenance,		room
Environmental, and		2) pipe size
Safety Plan Defense		3) valve station location
Fuel Support Point		
Pearl Harbor Bulk		
Terminal Pearl		
harbor, Hawaii.		
December 2023		
submitted by Pond		
and bhate.		
(Pond/bhate, 2023)		
Operation,	NAVY_0068580	1) location of primary control
Maintenance,		room
Environmental, and		2) pipe size
Safety Plan Defense		3) valve station location
Fuel Support Point		
Pearl Harbor Bulk		
Terminal Pearl		
harbor, Hawaii.		
December 2023		
submitted by Pond		
and bhate.		
(Pond/bhate, 2023)		

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Operation,	NAVY_0006608	1) location of primary control
Maintenance,		room
Environmental, and		2) pipe size
Safety Plan; Defense		3) valve station location
Fuel Support Point,		
Pearl Harbor Bulk		
Terminal, Pearl		
Harbor, Hawaii.		
August 2018		
submitted by Trinity,		
Bhate, and JV LLC,		
with support from		
Pond & Company.		
Kilo Pier Sequence	NAVY_0070979	1) pipe sizes
of Events, July 16,		2) valve station locations
2021.		
JBPHH-	NAVY_30B6_0002107	1) valve locations (stations and
Sustainment,		chambers)
Restoration and		
Mondernization		
Funding-Upper Tank		
Farm, Pipeline and		
Piers. Spreadsheet.		
Spill Prevention,	NAVY_0011577	Storage system diagrams
Control, and		
Countermeasure		
(SPCC) Plan for		
Commander Navy		
Region Hawaii		
(CNRH), NAVFAC		
Hawaii. December		
2019. PCCI Marine		
& Environmental		
Engineering (PCCI,		
Inc)		

2024 Annual Leak	NAVY_0068095	1) valve locations (stations and
Detection Testing		chambers)
Report of 29		
Sections of		
Petroleum Pipelines,		
Joint Base Pearl		
Harbor-Hickam		
Oahu HI. 12		
September 2024.		
Michael Baker		
International.		
Revised 2023	NAVY_0068229	1) valve locations (stations and
Second Annual Leak		chambers)
Detection Testing		2) pump house location
Report of 51		
Sections of		
Petroleum Pipelines.		
Joint Base Pearl		
Harbor-Hickam		
Oahu HI. 6 October		
2023. Michael Baker		
International.		
2022 Annual Leak	NAVY_0065538	1) valve locations (stations and
Detection Testing		chambers)
Report of 49		
Sections of		
Petroleum Pipelines,		
Joint Base Pearl		
Harbor-Hickam		
Oahu HI. 10 March		
2022. Michael Baker		
International.		
2021 Annual Leak	NAVY_0065431	1) valve locations (stations and
Detection Testing		chambers)
Report of 35		
Sections of		
Petroleum Pipelines,		
Joint Base Pearl		
Harbor-Hickam		
Oahu HI. 22 March		

	T	I
2021. Michael Baker		
International.		
USACE Fuels	USACE 0000001	Facility Number Column
Program (RMMR)	CSACL_0000001	contains DCRIT
Pearl Harbor FY14		Contains DCR11
to FY 24.		
Spreadsheet.	NAVV 0070272	rely locations (stations on 1
NAVFAC Contract	NAVY_0070363	valve locations (stations and
Report, Fuel		chambers)
Transfer		
Infrastructure		
Assessment Transfer		
Piping Inspection		
UGPH 59- Hotel		
Pier November 2022		
POL Pipelines	NAVY_0042047	1) valve locations (stations and
Integrity		chambers)
Management Plan		2) pylon locations
(IMP) (Oct. 2023)		3) pipe sizes
Part 4 Additional		4) riser locations
Supporting		
Information		
2024 Annual Static	NAVY_0069905	1) valve locations (stations and
Liquid Pressure		chambers)
Testing Report of		2) pipe sizes
One Section of		3) diagrams with specific pipe
Petroleum Pier		and valve station locations
Pipeline, Joint Base		
Pearl Harbor-		
Hickam, Hawaii		
(Feb. 2024)		

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NACFAV POL Out	SGH0000023	1) valve locations (stations and
of Service		chambers)
Requirements FY		2) valve sizes
25, Repair Scope		3) piling locations
Determination and		
Acceptance		
Satisfactory to		
Stakeholders		

DATED: Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, June 08, 2025

FLOYD.JOHN.LEWIS.10 Digitally signed by FLOYD.JOHN.LEWIS.1064149357
64149357 Date: 2025.06.08 19:09:44 -10'00'

Fuel Department Deputy Director, JBPHH

EXHIBIT A

Filed 06/09/25

DETERMINATION OF THE CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER

Under the authority delegated to me by the Secretary of Defense, I have determined that the following information is exempt from disclosure under Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)) because it meets the requirements for exemption under 10 U.S.C. § 130e:

Specific locations, physical vulnerabilities, and risk vulnerability assessments of the Department of the Navy's Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility (RHBFSF) tanks, pipelines, hydrants, and valves from the RHBFSF to and throughout Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam.

Date:	Digitally signed by HERSHMAN.LISA HERSHMAN.LISA.W.15445056 W.1544505641 Date: 2020.07.31 11:31:18 -04'00'
	Lisa W. Hershman
	Chief Management Officer

Filed 06/09/25

STATEMENT OF THE BASIS FOR THE DETERMINATION BY THE CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER

In accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 130e, I reviewed the information provided to me by the Department of the Navy (DON) concerning the safety and security of the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility (RHBFSF), including specific locations and physical vulnerabilities of fuel tanks, pipelines, values, hydrants, and documents containing risk and vulnerability assessments. Based on that review, I determined that information qualifies as Department of Defense (DoD) critical infrastructure security information (DCRIT). As defined by 10 U.S.C. § 130e(f), DCRIT includes:

"...sensitive but unclassified information that, if disclosed, would reveal vulnerabilities in Department of Defense critical infrastructure that, if exploited, would likely result in the significant disruption, destruction, or damage of or to Department of Defense operations, property, or facilities, including information regarding the securing and safeguarding of explosives, hazardous chemicals, or pipelines, related to critical infrastructure or protected systems owned or operated by or on behalf of the Department of Defense, including vulnerability assessments prepared by or on behalf of the Department of Defense, explosives safety information (including storage and handling), and other site-specific information on or relating to installation security."

The RHBFSF serves as the primary fuel storage facility for U.S. military ships and aircraft operating from Hawaii and throughout the Pacific Area of Operations, and it is of vital strategic significance. The RHBFSF holds a significant percentage of petroleum war reserves required to defend national security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. As USINDOPACOM's strategic reserve, it supports all U.S. military forces throughout the theater, including those stationed in and transiting through Hawaii. It also supports the Hawaii Army and Air National Guard, and is available to support civil authorities, should circumstances dictate. The hardened, underground, cyber-protected, gravity-fed fuel system is unique, and there is no comparable U.S. owned facility anywhere from India to the continental United States.

The first category of information identified as DCRIT includes physical vulnerabilities of fuel tanks, pipelines, valves, and facility operations. Examples include diagrams of tanks, pipelines, hydrant locations, and valve operations. If exploited, this information could provide a potential attacker with information that would allow them to determine how and where to most effectively execute an attack. The second category of documents identified as DCRIT are those that have the potential for misuse and harm, and would impact facility safety. Of particular concern are documents containing risk vulnerabilities and damage assessments. A person armed with rudimentary knowledge of this risk and damage information could easily determine areas vulnerable for attack.

I considered the public interest in the disclosure of this specific RHBFSF pipeline location and risk information and weighed it against the risk of harm that might result if this information were to be disclosed. Because the public interest in the disclosure is substantially

outweighed by the risk of harm that might result from the disclosure of this information, I have determined that the protection of this information is critical to the security of the DoD infrastructure and should be exempt from disclosure. This is especially true because more general information about the operations of the RHBFSF has already been released publically.